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Psychological Impacts of Terrorism

Tanielian and Stein (2006) write about the impacts on and needs for addressing the psychological impacts of terrorism. While terrorism is an act which is marked by physical destruction, loss of life, economic collapse, violence, and political aims, it is also intended to provoke fear in the population. It has psychological effects additionally through targeting “the social capital of a nation – cohesion, values, and ability to function. Therefore, successful counterterrorism and national continuity depend on effective interventions to sustain the psychological, behavioral, and social functioning of the nation and its citizens” (Tanielian & Stein, 2006, p.690). However, this aspect is woefully under addressed and not well understood.

Emotional and psychological responses to terrorism, even by those not immediately affected or witness to the event itself, can be present from no reaction at all, to mild symptoms, to development of severe mental illnesses (Ursano, Morganstein, & West, 2020). Distress reactions include changes in sleep, reduced sense of safety, isolation and avoidance, and irritability and distraction. Health risks include increased behaviors of smoking, alcohol, becoming overly involved in work or other tasks, separation anxiety, and fears about traveling nationally, internationally, or even outside one’s neighborhood or home. Psychiatric disorders can include anxiety, PTSD, acute traumatic stress, depression, and complex grief. In others, or in initial stages of a “honeymoon period” following an attack in those who later develop symptoms of mental distress or illness, there may be a sense of resiliency, of bonding, of heroism, and optimism. There can also be a reaction of anger and wanting retaliation. This can lead to pressure to develop harsher policies toward a broad group perceived to be associated with an attack, such as in the case of anti-Muslim policies in the U.S. following 9/11 and leading to the “Muslim ban” implemented by former President Trump (Haner, et al., 2019). This can also lead to a reaction of building of a group identity, framing those with any perceived association with the attack as bad and devaluing their humanity, and leading to the formation of extremist groups, further escalating conflict (Staub, 2012).

Tanielian & Stein (2006) discuss the need for further support and research of psychological reactions and distress from terrorist attacks. They note that “little national or local policy has focused on the importance of addressing psychology or mental health” as a part of the counterterrorism funding, policies, and response in the U.S.  Many research articles have studied the frequency, type, and intensity of psychological and mental health consequences of terrorism and natural disasters such as earthquakes. Both indirect and direct victims of a terrorist attack can experience psychological symptoms, but the most heavily affected are those who were directly affected, in the immediate area, or first responders. Vulnerable populations are also heavily impacted, “such as children, racial and ethnic minorities, and those with an existing psychiatric illness” (Tanielian & Stein, 2006, p.693). The article specifically details impacts on children, and how the interactions between parents and children can either increase symptoms in children, or possibly increase parents’ reporting of distress in their children. The article does make a cross-cultural reference to studies in Israel and compares it to studies in the U.S.

The article does also mention that there may be differences in reactions between ethnic and cultural groups, identifying disparities in increases of PTSD and lower utilization of medications and mental health services among Black and Latino people compared to White people (Tanielian & Stein, 2006). This is attributed to “various cultural factors, including valuing self-reliance, expressing emotions in certain ways, and having reservations about sharing emotions with others” (Tanielian & Stein, 2006, p.694). Considering this article was written in 2006, there was a lot less awareness of structural and systemic racism than there is today in 2021 in the U.S. I would argue that what is missing from this analysis of disparities in seeking services is the general distrust of the medical – inclusive of mental health – systems among Black communities due to a history of being abused by such services. This includes experiments done on slaves, and the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis study (Wells & Gowda, 2020). Other factors to consider in this population is the severe lack of Black physicians which are much preferred by the Black community, White physicians lacking cultural competency, history of segregated cities, and socioeconomic barriers.

Additionally, Latinos are the least likely ethnic group in the U.S. to utilize mental health services (Barrera & Longoria, 2018). Reasons for this also include socioeconomics, acculturation issues for immigrants (such as language barriers or not understanding the health care system), cultural stigma towards mental illness, and distrust of the medical and mental health systems due to “past experiences of discriminatory treatment or ineffective care” (Barrera & Longoria, 2018, p.3). The article by Tanielian & Stein (2006), while it touches lightly on the disparities and the need for increased cultural competence in delivering mental health services following a terrorist attack, does not fully account for such deep-rooted issues, which could limit much needed mental health care. Understanding the depth of these systemic factors are incredibly important for not just improving mental and physical health for minority populations in general, but even more so after an acute event such as a terrorist attack.

Tanielian & Stein (2006) note that one of the most important and beneficial strategies for reducing psychological distress after a terrorist attack is to build and strengthen community relationships. They also suggest that response strategies target the needs of specific groups such as victims, vulnerable groups, and first responders. They discuss the use of psychological first aid, and how the Red Cross has recently (as of the time of the article in 2006) begun a Disaster Mental Health program to specialize in and provide these services following disaster incidents, including terrorist events. The authors do note that there may be still problems with this, however, with a lack of cultural-specific training and training specific to terrorist attacks. I am a Disaster Mental Health volunteer with the Red Cross, and I find this absolutely to be the case – I did not receive any training for how to change services or tactics dependent on the type of disaster, nor any training on how to work with people of different cultural groups.

Tanielian & Stein (2006) focus their article on working on the psychological distress with victims following a terrorist attack. However, they fail to include broader implications in preventing the victimized groups developing their own group identity and resorting to retaliatory violence and extremist ideologies, dehumanizing anyone who might be perceived, often incorrectly, of having some association to the terrorists. This potentiality can build into exacerbated group conflict and encourage a cycle of dehumanization and violence towards the ‘other’ (Staub, 2012). While addressing mental health issues both short and long term for victims of a terrorist attack is incredibly important, I think it is also important to incorporate prevention plans to mitigate the growth of retaliatory group identities and future conflict. Finally, any mental health interventions must include comprehensive cultural training for professionals providing aid, including understandings of implicit bias and systemic factors.

References

Barrera, I., & Longoria, D. (2018). Examining cultural mental health care barriers among    Latinos. CLEARvoz Journal4(1).

Haner, M., Sloan, M. M., Cullen, F. T., Kulig, T. C., & Lero Jonson, C. (2019). Public concern       about terrorism: Fear, worry, and support for anti-Muslim policies. Socius5,   2378023119856825. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F2378023119856825

Staub, E. (2012). The roots and prevention of genocide and related mass violence. Chapter 2 in    Anstey, M., Meerts, P. & Zartman, I. W. (eds). The slippery slope to genocide: Reducing identity conflicts and preventing mass murder. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tanielian, T. & Stein, B.D. (2006). Understanding and preparing for the psychological        consequences of terrorism. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2006.             https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP1217.html.

Ursano, R.J., Morganstein, J.C., & West, J.C. (2020). Essential issues on terrorism: Planning for      acute response and intervention. In Vermetten, E., Frankova, I. Carmi, L., Chaban, O.,   Zohar, J. (eds). (2020). Risk management of terrorism induced stress. IOS Press.

Wells, L., & Gowda, A. (2020). A Legacy of Mistrust: African Americans and the US Healthcare      System. Proceedings of UCLA Health24.

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Instigators of group conflict & genocide

Staub (2012) identifies multiple instigators in group conflict and genocide. First is difficult life conditions which includes “severe economic problems, great political disorganization with a society, or great, rapid social changes and their combinations” (Staub, 2012, p.3). Difficult life conditions disrupt and exacerbate connections with others, self-identity, and safety and security. The social impacts of this may lead to a desperate attempt to identify with a group. Often these groups create a bond and identity through devaluing other groups and scapegoating others. This can give rise to ideologies which aim for changes which will improve the difficult life conditions, but do so in ostracizing and blaming others. While it is possible for these group initiatives to be positive and constructive, most often this pattern can elevate negatively, leading to mass violence against the “other.”

Another instigator is the “[c]onflict between groups, especially identity groups” (Staub, 2012, p.3). Disagreement and devaluing of other groups can lead them into conflict with one another, and as they become increasingly violent, this can spur on acts of genocide. Basic needs and resources can be a part of this, but the devaluation of other groups is still often combined with this. Ideologies of superiority justify actions against another group. Additionally, groups that have been devalued, are different from the mainstream, or are less privileged may begin demanding equal rights which can give rise to violent action. In the past, territorial conquest and colonization have been accomplished through violent means, including genocide. When group conflict escalates to war, genocide becomes further justified by one of the groups towards the other.

Reference

Staub, E. (2012). The roots and prevention of genocide and related mass violence. Chapter 2 in Anstey, M., Meerts, P. & Zartman, I. W. (eds). The slippery slope to genocide: Reducing identity conflicts and preventing mass murder. New York: Oxford University Press.

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The role of bystanders in group conflict

Staub (1999) investigates how bystanders can both normalize and perpetuate violence in group conflict but can also provide interventions which can end such violence. Bystanders can be internal, as in within the country or group, or external, such as in humanitarian aid organizations or other nations. In either case, my understanding is that bystanders are ones who bear witness to the conflict, but may not be directly involved in it, at least for a time. Passive bystanders are explicitly described by Staub (1999), but active bystanders are not named, although there are descriptions of active bystander interventions.

The involvement of other external bystander states are most often passive, unless they see an opportunity for self-gain in their involvement, such as in relation to “power, wealth, or influence. They have not seen themselves as moral agents with responsibility for the welfare of people outside their borders” (Staub, 1999, p.316). Furthermore, it is not uncommon for some countries to “actively support perpetrators” (Staub, 1999, p.308).

Internal bystanders also tend to remain passive (Staub, 1999), and while this might apply to much of the bystander population, I can think of many examples where internal bystanders have become active and attempted to intervene through various methods, such as both peaceful and violent protests. However, passive bystanders further create divide between groups, by the repeated messages by one group or government reinforcing the scapegoating of another group. Over time, these become ingrained beliefs in the civilian population – “it distances them from and leads them to increasing devalue victims. It diminishes their capacity to empathize with those in distress and their sense of guilt about their inaction. In the end, they go along with and frequently even support persecution and violence…” (Staub, 1999, p.308).

A current conflict showing many examples of the role of bystanders is the Syrian Civil War. The war has endured since 2011, and its length may have been significantly affected due to bystanders. It is a complicated war with many different sides triangulated against one another. The Assad governmental regime, the rebel groups opposing it, ISIS, the Kurds, Shia Muslim militias, and Hezbollah are the primary internal groups in conflict (BBC, 2017).  President al-Assad is himself from a minority group in Syria, the Alawites, and since coming to power he has systemically and actively encouraged discrimination towards many of Syria’s other ethnicities and religions. Thus, divisions were created between groups, as Staub (1999) identifies as part of the initial stages towards group conflict. When some protested this discrimination in Syria, the government took violent action, and conflict escalated quickly. Furthermore, Staub (1999) points out several cultural risk-factors contributing towards capacity for group conflict, and according to Hofstede Insights (n.d.), Syria has a number of these factors, including high power distance – which is tolerant of authoritarian systems, and high uncertainty avoidance. Another factor which perpetuates conflict is trauma, which can be imparted on multiple generations, and may make traumatized individuals more likely to have feelings of insecurity and react to real or perceived persecution with “defensive aggression” (Staub, 1999, p.310). Syrians have experienced high rates of individual and collective trauma, both in the internally and externally displaced, from not just the conflict, but also forced labor, human trafficking, and discrimination and violence by host communities where refugees seek asylum (Gerson, 2018).

Syria’s rise of internal active bystanders are comprised of several capacities, from armed militia rebel groups resisting and fighting back against the human rights violations of the government on civilians, and also groups like the White Helmets who avoid any active conflict, but take dangerous risks in order to rescue and provide medical care to those injured in attacks from both sides. Passive bystanders might include those civilians who have aligned themselves to the Assad regime, such as other Alawites, Christians, and the wealthy, and those in fear that the fall of the government would allow terrorist groups such as ISIS to take over (Christian Science Monitor, 2011). Both violent active and passive bystanders could be perpetuating the conflict through an overall increase in retaliatory violence on both sides, and in upholding discriminatory, divisive beliefs and institutions about the “other.”

External active bystanders have been many, and likely are the largest contributors to the ongoing conflict. Supporters of the Syrian government include Russia and Iran (BBC, 2017). Russia has carried out air strikes and provided political backing on behalf of the Assad regime at the UN (BBC, 2017), and this seems to be highly motivated by their own self-interest in being a major source of power in the Middle East and is concerned that regime changes could create even further instability – and a loss of Russian power, in addition to the benefits of their naval base and $5 billion in weapon sales to Syria (Calamur, 2013).

External bystanders on the side of the rebels include Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, and the U.S. (BBC, 2017). Under the Obama administration, the U.S. intervened by suppling some arms and troops to the rebels, but these were comparatively minimal (Gerson, 2018). While the U.S. claimed it was becoming an active bystander based on the human rights abuses by the Syrian government, it limited its aid because of hopes to make a nuclear deal with Iran, who supports the Syrian government. Under President Trump, the U.S. troops with withdrawn from Syria and ended all support to the rebels. It has been speculated that this decision was largely motivated by Trump’s intention to be on Russia’s ‘good’ side, with Russia backing the Syrian government.

There are many more examples and instances of how the war in Syria has been accelerated and worsened through complicated international bystanders, and also from within through internal bystanders. All of these examples are much too complex to lay out in full within this assignment, but I do hope this gives an overview of how Staub’s (1999) roles of bystanders in group conflicts has had a significant impact on the Syrian civil war.

References

BBC. (April 7, 2017). Syria war: A brief guide to who’s fighting whom. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39528673

Calamur, K. (August 28, 2013). Who are Syria’s friends and why are they supporting Assad? NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/08/28/216385513/who-are-syrias-friends-and-why-are-they-supporting-assad

Christian Science Monitor. (September 14, 2011). Why many Syrians still support Assad. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0914/Why-many-Syrians-still-support-Assad

Hofstede Insights. (n.d.). Country comparison: Syria. https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/syria/

Gerson, M. (April 2, 2018). Would you trust America? The Washington Post.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/would-you-trust-america/2018/04/02/5fc5b854-369e-11e8-8fd2-49fe3c675a89_story.html

Staub, E. (1999). The origins and prevention of genocide, mass killing, and other collective violence.  Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5, 303-336.