Staub (1999) investigates how bystanders can both normalize and perpetuate violence in group conflict but can also provide interventions which can end such violence. Bystanders can be internal, as in within the country or group, or external, such as in humanitarian aid organizations or other nations. In either case, my understanding is that bystanders are ones who bear witness to the conflict, but may not be directly involved in it, at least for a time. Passive bystanders are explicitly described by Staub (1999), but active bystanders are not named, although there are descriptions of active bystander interventions.
The involvement of other external bystander states are most often passive, unless they see an opportunity for self-gain in their involvement, such as in relation to “power, wealth, or influence. They have not seen themselves as moral agents with responsibility for the welfare of people outside their borders” (Staub, 1999, p.316). Furthermore, it is not uncommon for some countries to “actively support perpetrators” (Staub, 1999, p.308).
Internal bystanders also tend to remain passive (Staub, 1999), and while this might apply to much of the bystander population, I can think of many examples where internal bystanders have become active and attempted to intervene through various methods, such as both peaceful and violent protests. However, passive bystanders further create divide between groups, by the repeated messages by one group or government reinforcing the scapegoating of another group. Over time, these become ingrained beliefs in the civilian population – “it distances them from and leads them to increasing devalue victims. It diminishes their capacity to empathize with those in distress and their sense of guilt about their inaction. In the end, they go along with and frequently even support persecution and violence…” (Staub, 1999, p.308).
A current conflict showing many examples of the role of bystanders is the Syrian Civil War. The war has endured since 2011, and its length may have been significantly affected due to bystanders. It is a complicated war with many different sides triangulated against one another. The Assad governmental regime, the rebel groups opposing it, ISIS, the Kurds, Shia Muslim militias, and Hezbollah are the primary internal groups in conflict (BBC, 2017). President al-Assad is himself from a minority group in Syria, the Alawites, and since coming to power he has systemically and actively encouraged discrimination towards many of Syria’s other ethnicities and religions. Thus, divisions were created between groups, as Staub (1999) identifies as part of the initial stages towards group conflict. When some protested this discrimination in Syria, the government took violent action, and conflict escalated quickly. Furthermore, Staub (1999) points out several cultural risk-factors contributing towards capacity for group conflict, and according to Hofstede Insights (n.d.), Syria has a number of these factors, including high power distance – which is tolerant of authoritarian systems, and high uncertainty avoidance. Another factor which perpetuates conflict is trauma, which can be imparted on multiple generations, and may make traumatized individuals more likely to have feelings of insecurity and react to real or perceived persecution with “defensive aggression” (Staub, 1999, p.310). Syrians have experienced high rates of individual and collective trauma, both in the internally and externally displaced, from not just the conflict, but also forced labor, human trafficking, and discrimination and violence by host communities where refugees seek asylum (Gerson, 2018).
Syria’s rise of internal active bystanders are comprised of several capacities, from armed militia rebel groups resisting and fighting back against the human rights violations of the government on civilians, and also groups like the White Helmets who avoid any active conflict, but take dangerous risks in order to rescue and provide medical care to those injured in attacks from both sides. Passive bystanders might include those civilians who have aligned themselves to the Assad regime, such as other Alawites, Christians, and the wealthy, and those in fear that the fall of the government would allow terrorist groups such as ISIS to take over (Christian Science Monitor, 2011). Both violent active and passive bystanders could be perpetuating the conflict through an overall increase in retaliatory violence on both sides, and in upholding discriminatory, divisive beliefs and institutions about the “other.”
External active bystanders have been many, and likely are the largest contributors to the ongoing conflict. Supporters of the Syrian government include Russia and Iran (BBC, 2017). Russia has carried out air strikes and provided political backing on behalf of the Assad regime at the UN (BBC, 2017), and this seems to be highly motivated by their own self-interest in being a major source of power in the Middle East and is concerned that regime changes could create even further instability – and a loss of Russian power, in addition to the benefits of their naval base and $5 billion in weapon sales to Syria (Calamur, 2013).
External bystanders on the side of the rebels include Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, and the U.S. (BBC, 2017). Under the Obama administration, the U.S. intervened by suppling some arms and troops to the rebels, but these were comparatively minimal (Gerson, 2018). While the U.S. claimed it was becoming an active bystander based on the human rights abuses by the Syrian government, it limited its aid because of hopes to make a nuclear deal with Iran, who supports the Syrian government. Under President Trump, the U.S. troops with withdrawn from Syria and ended all support to the rebels. It has been speculated that this decision was largely motivated by Trump’s intention to be on Russia’s ‘good’ side, with Russia backing the Syrian government.
There are many more examples and instances of how the war in Syria has been accelerated and worsened through complicated international bystanders, and also from within through internal bystanders. All of these examples are much too complex to lay out in full within this assignment, but I do hope this gives an overview of how Staub’s (1999) roles of bystanders in group conflicts has had a significant impact on the Syrian civil war.
References
BBC. (April 7, 2017). Syria war: A brief guide to who’s fighting whom. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39528673
Calamur, K. (August 28, 2013). Who are Syria’s friends and why are they supporting Assad? NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/08/28/216385513/who-are-syrias-friends-and-why-are-they-supporting-assad
Christian Science Monitor. (September 14, 2011). Why many Syrians still support Assad. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0914/Why-many-Syrians-still-support-Assad
Hofstede Insights. (n.d.). Country comparison: Syria. https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/syria/
Gerson, M. (April 2, 2018). Would you trust America? The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/would-you-trust-america/2018/04/02/5fc5b854-369e-11e8-8fd2-49fe3c675a89_story.html
Staub, E. (1999). The origins and prevention of genocide, mass killing, and other collective violence. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5, 303-336.