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Comorbidity of PTSD and CPTSD with Other Mental & Physical Disorders in Syrian Populations

Comorbidities, both physical and mental, are quite common with PTSD and CPTSD (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1996). This is especially so among those who have been exposed to significant trauma, including from community violence and war. Hoppen and Morina (2019) conducted a meta-analysis on the comorbidity between PTSD and depression in war survivors worldwide and found that nearly half of those with PTSD also had major depression.

Al-Smadi et al. (2016) found that among Syrian refugees in Jordan, in more than half the participants, chronic diseases were comorbid with PTSD and depression. Chung et al. (2020) found that participants with lower physical health and social health scores had significantly higher rates of posttraumatic stress. Kizilhan (2017) discusses how people from Syria and other collectivistic cultures typically express PTSD through somatic symptoms and chronic pain. Grasser et al. (2020) noted co-morbidities in their sample of Syrian and Iraqi refugees between PTSD, anxiety, and depression. Furthermore, they collected saliva samples from participants and were able to find a correlation between these psychological disorders with higher rates of inflammatory responses, lower immunity, and increased susceptibility to diseases.

Middle Eastern cultures, such as those from Syria, are collectivistic and highly tied to their family groups (Chung et al., 2020; Kizilhan, 2017). As such, an “occurrence of trauma to a family member means trauma to the whole family. In other words, PTSD is a within-and-between-individuals phenomenon for an Arabic family” (Chung et al., 2020 p.6). In most peoples, but especially in those in collectivistic cultures, rely heavily on social networks, which buffer against both physical and mental health problems (Powell et al., 2020). Oppression as experienced by Syrian refugees and internally displaced persons is both individual and collective, and is linked with higher rates of PTSD, CPTSD, poor physical health, higher suicidality, and existential annihilation anxiety (Ibraheem et al., 2017).

References

Al-Smadi, A. M., Halaseh, H. J., Gammoh, O. S., Ashour, A. F., Gharaibeh, B., & Khoury, L. S. (2016). Do chronic diseases and availability of medications predict post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among Syrian refugees in Jordan. Pak J Nutr15(10), 936-941.

Chung, M. C., AlQarni, N., AlMazrouei, M., Al Muhairi, S., Shakra, M., Mitchell, B., Al Mazrouei, S., & Al Hashimi, S. (2020). Posttraumatic stress disorder and psychiatric co-morbidity among Syrian refugees: the role of trauma exposure, trauma centrality, self-efficacy and emotional suppression. Journal of mental health (Abingdon, England), 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638237.2020.1755023

Grasser, L. R., Burghardt, P., Daugherty, A. M., Amirsadri, A., & Javanbakht, A. (2020). Inflammation and Trauma-Related Psychopathology in Syrian and Iraqi Refugees. Behavioral Sciences10(4), 75. doi:10.3390/bs10040075

Hoppen, T. H., & Morina, N. (2019). The prevalence of PTSD and major depression in the global population of adult war survivors: a meta-analytically informed estimate in absolute numbers. European journal of psychotraumatology10(1), 1578637. https://doi.org/10.1080/20008198.2019.1578637

Al Ibraheem, B., Kira, I. A., Aljakoub, J., & Al Ibraheem, A. (2017). The health effect of the Syrian conflict on IDPs and refugees. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 23(2), 140. https://doi.org/10.1037/pac0000247

Kizilhan, J. I. (2018). Trauma and pain in family-orientated societies. International journal of environmental research and public health15(1), 44.

Powell, T. M., Shin, O. J., Li, S. J., & Hsiao, Y. (2020). Post-traumatic stress, social, and physical health: A mediation and moderation analysis of Syrian refugees and Jordanians in a border community. PloS one15(10), e0241036. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0241036

Van der Kolk, B.A. & McFarlane, A.C. (1996). Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming Experience on Mind, Body, and Society. New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 

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Symptoms of PTSD and Complex PTSD in Western Cultures & Syrian Culture

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is a psychological disorder which is included in both the DSM and the ICD-11, but only the ICD-11 explicitly includes a distinction of Complex PTSD (CPTSD) (Cloitre et al., 2019). The inclusion of CPTSD is important, as it encompasses research on how PTSD manifests within prolonged or repeated trauma exposure, particularly in early childhood, but also include the impacts of cultural and collective trauma (Hirschberger, 2018), such as that which is experienced in mass catastrophic events such as war, genocide, slavery, colonization, racial trauma (Comas-Díaz et al., 2019), etc., and intergenerational trauma (Yehuda & Lehrner, 2018). The civil war in Syria, ongoing since 2011, is one example of such a significant collective trauma, which may have lasting intergenerational trauma effects. However, the Western medical-style model of diagnosis of mental illnesses does not explicitly account for cultural differences in how Syrians experience, understand, and express trauma.

Van der Kolk and McFarlane (1997), who provide a deep understanding of the multitude of ways that trauma can manifest beyond what manuals like the DSM provide or ICD-11 provide, write that “experiencing trauma is an essential part of being human; history is written in blood” (p.3). Traumatic experiences can vary in their intensity, and whether they develop into the pathology of PTSD depends on their context, and the coping skills of the individual experiencing the event. Some people can process such traumatic exposures in ways which allow them to return to healthy functioning, while others do not. Those that develop PTSD start to develop unhealthy defense mechanisms and behaviors to avoid even subtle reminders of the trauma, which can affect the entire way that they structure their lives. “The core issue is the inability to integrate the reality of particular experiences, and the resulting repetitive replaying of the trauma in images, behaviors, feelings, physiological states, and interpersonal relationships” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1997, p.7). In most cases, PTSD is spurned from a singular event, or tightly clustered events, while CPTSD occurs when there is repeated or prolonged exposure to traumatic situations, such as child abuse at a critical stage of development. Due to the nature of PTSD broadly, trauma victims tend to reenact (usually subconsciously) the trauma in other aspects of their lives, leading to continued traumatic experiences, further deepening the complexity of CPTSD (Foa et al., 2009).

Whole societies and cultures can also be traumatized and can follow “roughly similar patterns of adaptation and disintegration” (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1997, p. 3) as traumatized individuals. States can react to traumatized populations in various ways – in the U.S. it is typically with some immediate compassion, but a fallback on an attitude of blaming victims as their own responsibility for the trauma, seeking to maintain the status quo, and projecting a message of safety for society (van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1997). When considering the case of Syria, the authoritarian regime has sought to eradicate trauma narratives and instead impose their own version of the story through such tactics as monopolizing higher education to maintain their power and enforce their political agenda. (Al Azmeth et al., 2020). Matos et al. (2021) found that “…war severely disrupted Syrians’ sense of collective self, and that they repeatedly engaged in search for meaning, appraisals of the war, and reappraisals of shattered beliefs, life goals, and sense of purpose, both during wartime and in resettlement” (p.1).

Vallieres et al. (2018) conducted a study of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, using the International Trauma Questionnaire (ITQ) and the ICD-11 in examining both CPTSD and PTSD levels and validity for this population. They found that CPTSD was more prevalent than PTSD, and that the ICD-11 and ITQ were cross-culturally applicable – with some limitations. The levels of traumatic exposure were high, with the events ranked as most distressing by participants being forced displacement, bombings, and losing loved ones both through unexpected deaths and forced separations. Participants shared that they felt that the questionnaire seemed to be understanding of their experience. One noted limitation was that common symptoms were amnesia and lack of concentration, but these weren’t addressed in the ITQ questionnaire. Participants also felt some of the questions were irrelevant to their situation and cultural context. It was also noted that completing the questionnaire was unfamiliar and challenging to many refugees – so it may be that the use of such assessments give poor reliability within this cultural context. Furthermore, the trauma of some participants made them hesitant in answering some of the questions, invoking what would appear to be paranoia and hypervigilance. The authors suggest that the use of such questionnaires or assessments may first require a building of rapport and trust with the person administering them. This challenges the Western model of research, in which the researcher is to remain unbiased and emotionally removed from the participants (Jhangiani & Tarry, 2014).

Syrians express trauma and mental illness differently from Western societies. A study on PTSD and CPTSD using the ICD-11 in the US did not include questions or measures on somatic symptoms (Cloitre et al., 2019). The above study on Syrian refugees by Vallieres et al. (2018) similarly did not include somatic symptoms. However, somatic descriptions were commonly found as expressions of mental illness, distress, and trauma in other studies (Barkil-Oteo, 2018; Borho et al., 2021; Hassan et al., 2015). Barkil-Oteo et al. (2018) state that traditional, even culturally adapted, measures were insufficient in capturing the true range of symptoms experienced by refugees, who, in addition to prior trauma exposures, have “both repeated and ongoing traumatic triggers (fear from the past, current uncertainties, new traumas)” (p.9). They noted high prevalence of fainting, dizziness, weakness, and chronic pain in this population which had been ruled out of medical causes. Patients often first presented with such physical complaints before sharing emotional or mental distress. Borho et al. (2021) found a high correlation between somatic complaints and traumatic exposures, stress, and depression and anxiety symptoms in Syrian refugees in Germany. Syrians “do not separate somatic experience and psychological symptoms, because body and soul are interlinked in explanatory models of illness” (Hassan et al., 2015, p. 22).  One explanation for this emphasis on psychical symptoms is that mental illness is not well understood and is highly stigmatized in Syrian culture. Furthermore, the cultural framework within both Islam and Christianity (the primary religions of Syria) is that suffering is a part of being alive and does not need special interventions unless it is severe. However, with the increased normalization of mental health within host countries and among communities of refugees, knowledge and awareness of mental health and PTSD are growing and losing some of their stigma.

Hasan et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive overview of culturally specific idioms of distress for Syrian peoples. For example, saying one is tired or their psyche is tired “refers to a general state of ill being and may stand for a range of emotional symptoms, but also for relationship difficulties” (Hassan et al., 2015, p. 22). Ruminative thoughts are attributed to the influence of the devil, and severe mental and emotional disorders are sometimes considered to be the work of mischievous or evil spirits such as jinn. Symptoms of mental distress, which can also be comorbid with PTSD and CPTSD include such things as anxiety, depression, cognitive difficulties, helplessness, anger or aggression, and extreme stress, are often described in proverbs or metaphors. Western-trained professionals may misconstrue these as psychotic indicators. An example of a somatic description of fear or anxiety is a literal sensation of one’s heart crumbling or falling. An example of a metaphorical description for helplessness is “the eye sees but the hand is short or cannot reach” (Hassan et al., 2015, p. 23).

There is very little research on Syrians’ mental health, including trauma rates and responses, from before the onset of the war in 2011. Therefore, much of the research today comes from Syrian refugees residing outside of Syria. Furthermore, nearly all the research is focused on trauma exposures and PTSD rather than CPTSD. As noted previously, notions of mental illness and trauma are becoming increasingly normalized in this population, so, the conceptualizations and experiences of trauma may also be shifting to align more with those of the host countries’. Collective trauma is extensive in the case of the Syrian war, and the primary coping method of social connection (Hassan et al., 2015) – of extreme importance in collectivistic cultures – is radically disrupted, damaging possible resilience pathways for many Syrians.

References

Al Azmeh, Z., Dillabough, J., Fimyar, O., McLaughlin, C., Abdullateef, S., Aloklah, W. A., … &      Kadan, B. (2021). Cultural trauma and the politics of access to higher education in    Syria. Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education42(4), 528-543.

Barkil-Oteo, A., Abdallah, W., Mourra, S., & Jefee-Bahloul, H. (2018). Trauma and resiliency: A    tale of a Syrian refugee. American journal of psychiatry175(1), 8-12.

Borho, A., Morawa, E., Schmitt, G.M. et al. (2021). Somatic distress among Syrian refugees          with residence permission in Germany: analysis of a cross-sectional register-based study. BMC Public Health 21896. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-021-10731-x

Cloitre, M., Hyland, P., Bisson, J. I., Brewin, C. R., Roberts, N. P., Karatzias, T., & Shevlin, M.     (2019). ICD‐11 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Complex Posttraumatic Stress   Disorder in the United States: A population‐based study. Journal of Traumatic Stress,   32(6), 833–842.

Comas-Díaz L, Hall, G. N., & Neville, H. A. (2019). Racial trauma: theory, research, and      healing: introduction to the special issue. The American Psychologist, 74(1), 1–5.

Foa, E.B., Keane, T.M., Friedman, M.J., & Cohen, J.A. (2009). Effective Treatments for PTSD.        Practice Guidelines from the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies (2nd ed.).        New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 

Hassan, G., Kirmayer, L.J., Mekki-Berrada A., Quosh, C., el Chammay, R., Deville-Stoetzel,          J.B., Youssef, A., Jefee-Bahloul, H., Barkeel-Oteo, A., Coutts, A., Song, S. & Ventevogel,          P. (2015). Culture, Context and the Mental Health and Psychosocial Wellbeing of      Syrians: A Review for Mental Health and Psychosocial Support staff working with     Syrians Affected by Armed Conflict. Geneva: UNHCR.

Hirschberger, G. (2018). Collective trauma and the social construction of meaning. Frontiers of     Psychology, 9, 1441.

Jhangiani, R. & Tarry, H. (2014). Conducting research in social psychology. Principles of social     psychology – 1st international ed.             https://opentextbc.ca/socialpsychology/chapter/conducting-research-in-social-            psychology/

Matos, L., Costa, P.A., Park, C.L., Indart, M.J., & Leal, I. (2021). ‘The war made me a better   person’: Syrian refugees’ meaning-making – Trajectories in the aftermath of collective        trauma. Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health18. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph18168481

Vallières, F., Ceannt, R., Daccache, F., Abou Daher, R., Sleiman, J., Gilmore, B., … & Hyland, P.       (2018). Are posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and complex-PTSD distinguishable            within a treatment-seeking sample of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon?. Global Mental       Health5. DOI: 10.1111/acps.12973

Van der Kolk, B.A. & McFarlane, A.C. (1996). Traumatic Stress: The Effects of Overwhelming            Experience on Mind, Body, and Society. New York, NY: The Guilford Press.  Yehuda, R., & Lehrner, A. (2018). Intergenerational transmission of trauma effects: Putative role   of epigenetic mechanisms. World Psychiatry, 17(3), 243–257

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Sway Presentation: Traumatic Stress & Syrian Cultural Conceptualizations

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Papers, Docs, and Essays

Instigators of group conflict & genocide

Staub (2012) identifies multiple instigators in group conflict and genocide. First is difficult life conditions which includes “severe economic problems, great political disorganization with a society, or great, rapid social changes and their combinations” (Staub, 2012, p.3). Difficult life conditions disrupt and exacerbate connections with others, self-identity, and safety and security. The social impacts of this may lead to a desperate attempt to identify with a group. Often these groups create a bond and identity through devaluing other groups and scapegoating others. This can give rise to ideologies which aim for changes which will improve the difficult life conditions, but do so in ostracizing and blaming others. While it is possible for these group initiatives to be positive and constructive, most often this pattern can elevate negatively, leading to mass violence against the “other.”

Another instigator is the “[c]onflict between groups, especially identity groups” (Staub, 2012, p.3). Disagreement and devaluing of other groups can lead them into conflict with one another, and as they become increasingly violent, this can spur on acts of genocide. Basic needs and resources can be a part of this, but the devaluation of other groups is still often combined with this. Ideologies of superiority justify actions against another group. Additionally, groups that have been devalued, are different from the mainstream, or are less privileged may begin demanding equal rights which can give rise to violent action. In the past, territorial conquest and colonization have been accomplished through violent means, including genocide. When group conflict escalates to war, genocide becomes further justified by one of the groups towards the other.

Reference

Staub, E. (2012). The roots and prevention of genocide and related mass violence. Chapter 2 in Anstey, M., Meerts, P. & Zartman, I. W. (eds). The slippery slope to genocide: Reducing identity conflicts and preventing mass murder. New York: Oxford University Press.

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The role of bystanders in group conflict

Staub (1999) investigates how bystanders can both normalize and perpetuate violence in group conflict but can also provide interventions which can end such violence. Bystanders can be internal, as in within the country or group, or external, such as in humanitarian aid organizations or other nations. In either case, my understanding is that bystanders are ones who bear witness to the conflict, but may not be directly involved in it, at least for a time. Passive bystanders are explicitly described by Staub (1999), but active bystanders are not named, although there are descriptions of active bystander interventions.

The involvement of other external bystander states are most often passive, unless they see an opportunity for self-gain in their involvement, such as in relation to “power, wealth, or influence. They have not seen themselves as moral agents with responsibility for the welfare of people outside their borders” (Staub, 1999, p.316). Furthermore, it is not uncommon for some countries to “actively support perpetrators” (Staub, 1999, p.308).

Internal bystanders also tend to remain passive (Staub, 1999), and while this might apply to much of the bystander population, I can think of many examples where internal bystanders have become active and attempted to intervene through various methods, such as both peaceful and violent protests. However, passive bystanders further create divide between groups, by the repeated messages by one group or government reinforcing the scapegoating of another group. Over time, these become ingrained beliefs in the civilian population – “it distances them from and leads them to increasing devalue victims. It diminishes their capacity to empathize with those in distress and their sense of guilt about their inaction. In the end, they go along with and frequently even support persecution and violence…” (Staub, 1999, p.308).

A current conflict showing many examples of the role of bystanders is the Syrian Civil War. The war has endured since 2011, and its length may have been significantly affected due to bystanders. It is a complicated war with many different sides triangulated against one another. The Assad governmental regime, the rebel groups opposing it, ISIS, the Kurds, Shia Muslim militias, and Hezbollah are the primary internal groups in conflict (BBC, 2017).  President al-Assad is himself from a minority group in Syria, the Alawites, and since coming to power he has systemically and actively encouraged discrimination towards many of Syria’s other ethnicities and religions. Thus, divisions were created between groups, as Staub (1999) identifies as part of the initial stages towards group conflict. When some protested this discrimination in Syria, the government took violent action, and conflict escalated quickly. Furthermore, Staub (1999) points out several cultural risk-factors contributing towards capacity for group conflict, and according to Hofstede Insights (n.d.), Syria has a number of these factors, including high power distance – which is tolerant of authoritarian systems, and high uncertainty avoidance. Another factor which perpetuates conflict is trauma, which can be imparted on multiple generations, and may make traumatized individuals more likely to have feelings of insecurity and react to real or perceived persecution with “defensive aggression” (Staub, 1999, p.310). Syrians have experienced high rates of individual and collective trauma, both in the internally and externally displaced, from not just the conflict, but also forced labor, human trafficking, and discrimination and violence by host communities where refugees seek asylum (Gerson, 2018).

Syria’s rise of internal active bystanders are comprised of several capacities, from armed militia rebel groups resisting and fighting back against the human rights violations of the government on civilians, and also groups like the White Helmets who avoid any active conflict, but take dangerous risks in order to rescue and provide medical care to those injured in attacks from both sides. Passive bystanders might include those civilians who have aligned themselves to the Assad regime, such as other Alawites, Christians, and the wealthy, and those in fear that the fall of the government would allow terrorist groups such as ISIS to take over (Christian Science Monitor, 2011). Both violent active and passive bystanders could be perpetuating the conflict through an overall increase in retaliatory violence on both sides, and in upholding discriminatory, divisive beliefs and institutions about the “other.”

External active bystanders have been many, and likely are the largest contributors to the ongoing conflict. Supporters of the Syrian government include Russia and Iran (BBC, 2017). Russia has carried out air strikes and provided political backing on behalf of the Assad regime at the UN (BBC, 2017), and this seems to be highly motivated by their own self-interest in being a major source of power in the Middle East and is concerned that regime changes could create even further instability – and a loss of Russian power, in addition to the benefits of their naval base and $5 billion in weapon sales to Syria (Calamur, 2013).

External bystanders on the side of the rebels include Turkey, the Gulf Arab states, and the U.S. (BBC, 2017). Under the Obama administration, the U.S. intervened by suppling some arms and troops to the rebels, but these were comparatively minimal (Gerson, 2018). While the U.S. claimed it was becoming an active bystander based on the human rights abuses by the Syrian government, it limited its aid because of hopes to make a nuclear deal with Iran, who supports the Syrian government. Under President Trump, the U.S. troops with withdrawn from Syria and ended all support to the rebels. It has been speculated that this decision was largely motivated by Trump’s intention to be on Russia’s ‘good’ side, with Russia backing the Syrian government.

There are many more examples and instances of how the war in Syria has been accelerated and worsened through complicated international bystanders, and also from within through internal bystanders. All of these examples are much too complex to lay out in full within this assignment, but I do hope this gives an overview of how Staub’s (1999) roles of bystanders in group conflicts has had a significant impact on the Syrian civil war.

References

BBC. (April 7, 2017). Syria war: A brief guide to who’s fighting whom. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39528673

Calamur, K. (August 28, 2013). Who are Syria’s friends and why are they supporting Assad? NPR. https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/08/28/216385513/who-are-syrias-friends-and-why-are-they-supporting-assad

Christian Science Monitor. (September 14, 2011). Why many Syrians still support Assad. https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0914/Why-many-Syrians-still-support-Assad

Hofstede Insights. (n.d.). Country comparison: Syria. https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-comparison/syria/

Gerson, M. (April 2, 2018). Would you trust America? The Washington Post.  https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/would-you-trust-america/2018/04/02/5fc5b854-369e-11e8-8fd2-49fe3c675a89_story.html

Staub, E. (1999). The origins and prevention of genocide, mass killing, and other collective violence.  Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 5, 303-336.

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Cultural Demographics of Syria

Syria is a middle-income developing country which has been ravished over the last 9 years by civil war. Because of the war and the mass number of civilian refugees and internally displaced persons, it is nearly impossible to calculate the current demographics within the country.  Most of the information I have been able to gather is based on pre-2011 data. 

Religious beliefs are often closely connected to individuals’ ethnic identities in Syria.  About 75% of the population is Sunni Muslim (BBC, 2011). The remaining 25% is split between Christians, Alawites, Druze and Ismailis.  There are also groups of Gypsy peoples, such as the Bedouin and Roma. Additionally, prior to the war, refugees from Iraq and Palestine and migrants from Lebanon, Armenia, and Israel, resided in Syria, though most have now left (Minority Rights Group International, 2011).

The Kurds comprise the largest ethnic minority with 10-15% of the population (BBC, 2011), and are concentrated around Northern and Northeastern Syria. Many Kurds were marginalized in Turkey and Iraq and so had moved into Syria prior to the civil war. However, with the civil war, many Kurds accused the Syrian government of discrimination and refusing them basic social, political, and cultural rights.  Kurdish protestors can expect to be jailed, and their political party is banned.

Alawites are Shia Muslim, and are the largest religious minority in Syria, accounting for 8-15% of the population (BBC, 2011). Despite being a minority, they control the most power.  President Bashar ad-Assad is Alawite, and most of his top government officials are also. Despite this, the Alawite community as a whole has been taken advantage of because of this, being coerced into being “thugs” which are used to intimidate, beat, and kill protestors of the regime.

Syrian Christians observe the Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox denominations and have most of their populations focused in the major cities (BBC, 2011). Christians in Syria, despite being a significant minority, have a high amount of religious tolerance, worshiping freely and holding some high positions in government. Christians in Syria have mostly not been active in the protests, out of fear that the Islamic government would deny them religious freedom. They have been more visible in support of the regime. 

Ismailis are made up of about 200,000 people in Syria and are a branch of Shia Muslim with about 15 million followers worldwide (BBC, 2011). They are most concentrated around the city of Salamia. They reportedly fall on both sides of the civil war – some pro-regime, and others against it. 

The Druze reside mostly in Southern Syria, and number between 500,000 – 700,000 (BBC, 2011). They follow a religion based on Ismailism. The Druze have a history of being revolutionaries, and a major Lebanese Druze leader scolded the community for not being more active in the protests in Syria.  This was countered by the government regime actively seeking their support. 

Syrian Gypsies are much harder to calculate their population, as some are nomadic, but are estimated to number around 250,000 – 300,000 (Williams, 2001).  They consist of Bedouin peoples, who traditionally are nomadic herders, whose religious beliefs are a mix of pre-Islamic indigenous beliefs and modern Islam. Roma, Nawari, and Dom are other Syrian Gypsy groups.  

The primary languages spoken in Syria include Arabic (the official language), Kurdish (Kimanji dialect, Armenian, Aramaic, Circassian, and Turkish (Minority Rights Group International, 2011). The CIA World Factbook lists the following estimated population spread of Syria as of 2017: 

0-14 years: 31.62% (male 2,923,814/female 2,777,073)

15-24 years: 19.54% (male 1,790,360/female 1,732,694)

25-54 years: 39.22% (male 3,522,653/female 3,547,540)

55-64 years: 5.41% (male 482,576/female 493,085)

65 years and over: 4.21% (male 342,407/female 416,347

The economy has declined by about 70% since the onset of the war in 2011 (CIA World Factbook, 2017). More than half the population live in poverty, and a quarter live in extreme poverty, and an unemployment rate of nearly 50%, as of 2013 (Syrian Centre for Policy Research, 2013). Services have become extremely limited, with schools and healthcare facilities being targets of bombing by the government.

Human rights violations are a constant concern in Syria.  Working as an international psychologist, the challenges to help Syria are many and complex. The priority would be finding a way to have the government end the civil war and the attacks on civilians.  Following this, infrastructure within the country will need to be rebuilt.  Addressing the mental health concerns, including war trauma, for residents as well as refugees is also of a high priority. 

References

BBC. (December 9, 2011). Guide: Syria’s diverse minorities. BBC News. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16108755

CIA World Factbook. (2017). Syria. Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html

Minority Rights Group International. (October, 2011). World directory of minorities and indigenous peoples – Syria. UNHCR.  Retrieved from http://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce5ac.html

Syrian Centre for Policy Research. (October, 2013). Syria: War on development: socioeconomic monitoring report of Syria, second quarterly report (April – June 2013). United Nations Development Program. Retrieved from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/crisis-prevention-and-recovery/syria-war-on-development–socioeconomic-monitoring-report-of-syr.html

Williams, A. (2001).  The Gypsies of Syria. Dom Research Center, 1(4). Retrieved from http://www.domresearchcenter.com/journal/14/syria4.html

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Humanitarianism

The Syrian White Helmets

The Syrian Civil Defense, more widely known as the Syrian White Helmets, are an organization of volunteers within Syria and in parts of Turkey. The group is made of up of “[f]ormer bakers, tailors, engineers, pharmacists, painters, carpenters, students and many more professions besides” (White Helmets, n.d., par.5). They primarily operate in opposition-held areas of Syria It was formed in 2014, but began with grassroots movements of volunteer rescue teams in 2012 (Aikins, 2014) with the escalation of the Syrian Civil War after a failed ceasefire which had been implemented by the UN (BBC, 2012). It was the beginnings of The White Helmets which drew the world’s hearts towards the conflict in Syria – the image of Omran, the five year old covered in blood and dust sitting alone in the ambulance; the video of an infant being desperately pulled from the rubble of a bombed building (Malsin, n.d.).

The group’s humanitarian framework comes from international humanitarian law from the Geneva Convention, and guided by philosophy from the Quran (The White Helmets, n.d.). Their motto, from the Quran, is “to save a life is to save all of humanity” (The White Helmets, n.d., par. 7), and they ascribe to the international humanitarian laws principles of Humanity, Solidarity, and Impartiality. They have been nominated three times for the Nobel Peace Prize and have had a Netflix documentary made about them. Their organizational structure is run by a democratically elected council and led by Raed al Saleh.

They have nearly 3000 volunteers and have rescued more than 115,000 individuals from the rubble after air raid attacks (Syria Civil Defense, n.d.). They have 221 female volunteers and openly state that they seek to include women in their work alongside male volunteers, and also in services specific to women such as maternal health clinics (The White Helmets, n.d.), as is culturally acceptable. 252 volunteers have been killed, and more than 500 injured (The White Helmets, n.d.). More than half of those killed have been in “double tap” attacks, where there is an initial attack, then a second attack after rescuers arrive to help, to specifically target them. Additionally, in 2018, about 100 White Helmet volunteers along with their families were emergency evacuated by a rescue group from Israel after becoming trapped by the Syrian military (BBC, 2018).  800 volunteers and their families had been planned for, but nearly half did not make it for the one-time rescue operation.

One of the founders of the organization, from Britain, James Le Mesurier, had created another nonprofit, called Mayday Rescue, in order to fundraise, provide equipment, and train the White Helmets in urban search and rescue (Yee, 2019).  He was found dead in Turkey in 2019 under suspicious circumstances following multiple disinformation campaigns against him by the Russian Foreign Ministry, claiming that both he and the White Helmets were actually a terrorist organization linked with al-Qaeda (Yee, 2019). Others, likely fueled by this propaganda, speculate that the White Helmets are propaganda themselves for the interests of the US and NATO (Kakade, 2016). However, the claims that the White Helmets are linked with terrorist organizations and have staged mass casualty events have been thoroughly discredited as a clear ploy by the Russian and Syrian governments (Palma, 2016, Solon, 2017).

The primary goals of the group exist within the physical and cultural space of Syria, comprised of Syrians. Their ultimate aim is to provide emergency humanitarian relief in the Syrian Civil War to anyone who is suffering, and they are known for their dangerous attempts at saving lives at any cost (James, 2014). Their actions are to act as first responders following airstrikes in Syria, providing “emergency evacuation, urban search and rescue, firefighting, community engagement, and medical response” (Asif & Asif, 2018, p. 27). Additionally, they have developed an emergency plan to prevent the spreading of COVID-19 in Syria and go door-to-door to raise awareness, while also disinfecting public areas including camps and buildings, coordinating with medical professionals in setting up quarantine facilities, and training specialized teams on how to safely evacuate COVID-infected individuals to hospitals (The White Helmets, n.d.).

An important cultural consideration of humanitarian work is the effect that outside international aid has towards the local community. The White Helmets have been much more successful than Doctors Without Borders AKA MSF, most likely due to this discrepancy of trust (Asif & Asif, 2018). An outsider can create a feeling of shame, as if one is being pitied by the international community and is hopeless to help themselves, while a culturally native individual represents strength, solidarity, trust, and resiliency. “Thus, the clinical encounter between the native population and the foreign doctor becomes a microcosm of colonial rule, one that is characterized by confrontation and distrust” (Asif & Asif, 2018, p.27). The White Helmets are also committed to the long-term rebuilding of Syria as they are Syrians themselves, and want to ensure the peace, safety, and welfare of Syrian communities in infrastructure, and social, physical, and emotional health. It is because of these culturally-relevant investments and actions that it has been recommended to increase trauma-informed psychological care training for the volunteers, as they are in a unique position to deliver such services in the immediate and long term within Syria (Lester, 2018).

While the group was founded by international backers, its approximately 3000 volunteer members are Syrians themselves (Daley, 2016). As such, they have not ever been involved in another conflict, so can only be judged on their capacity within the one context they are serving. Additionally, they appear to be culturally sensitive in that they operate within the Syrian context.  However, this does not always mean that all Syrian cultures are equally respected, although the group strives for impartiality. There have been some criticisms of their ability to do so, stating that they are opposed to the government regime, and actually are encouraging the Syrian Civil War to continue through taking sides in the conflict and continuing to accept funding from Western backers (Moore, 2019). However, evidence and support of this opinion is scarce. That being said, it is understandable that the group would be largely opposed to the governmental regime, who has been criticized heavily for their attacks on their own civilians and human rights abuses (Amnesty International, n.d.). Despite this, The White Helmets claim that they have saved lives on all sides of the conflict, including government soldiers (The White Helmets, n.d.).

Below is the information directly from the Syria Civil Defense web page on “What We Do” (n.d.)

We are a humanitarian organisation dedicated to helping communities to prepare for, respond to and rebuild after attacks in our beloved Syria.

We are best known for our search and rescue services following bombings but we provide a range of services inline with the internationally recognised activities of civil defense.

We work according to the guidelines for civil defence organisations across the world, as well as in accordance with International Humanitarian Law. As defined in Protocol I (Article 61) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, we pledge to provide the services listed at paragraph 5:

  1. Warning the civilian population of attacks and dangers
  2. Urban Search and Rescue
  3. Evacuation of the civilian population from areas into which fighting is encroaching
  4. The provision of medical services – including first aid – at the point of injury
  5. Fire-fighting
  6. Management of emergency shelters
  7. Detection and marking of danger areas (such as areas with unexploded ordnance)
  8. Provision of emergency accommodation and supplies
  9. Emergency repair of indispensable public utilities
  10. Decontamination and similar protective measures
  11. Assistance in the preservation of objects essential for survival
  12. Emergency assistance in the restoration and maintenance of order in distressed areas
  13. Emergency disposal of the dead
  14. Management of blackout measures
  15. Complementary activities needed to carry out any of the tasks mentioned above.

As outlined in the Protocol I (Article 61) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 we provide these services for the following purposes:

  • To protect the civilian population against the dangers arising from hostilities or other disasters
  • To speed recovery from the immediate effects of such events To provide the conditions necessary for survival of the civilian population.

While civil defence organizations are protected under the international humanitarian law applicable to all civilians and civilian objects in general, the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, adopted in 1977, makes protection specific for civil defence.

Additionally, the White Helmets web page (n.d.) makes it clear that the organization is committed to helping rebuild physically and mentally in rebuilding communities following the end of the Civil War. One point that I found somewhat confusing is the utilization of two different web pages for the organization. It appears the White Helmets web page (n.d.) is aimed more towards generating support and fundraising, while the Syria Civil Defense website (n.d.) has more information about the organization itself and press releases.

Remember Omran, that bloodied and dusty five-year-old in the ambulance whose image wrecked our hearts all over the world? In 2017, the Syrian government media released new photos and videos of him, along with statements by the boy’s father that the family was pro-regime and that the child had been used by the rebel forces as fake propaganda (Specia & Samaan, 2017). This is just another example of how the truth around the White Helmets, and the war in Syria as a whole, is constantly being twisted and changed, making it difficult to know the truth (Haddad, 2016). Social media exacerbates this, with clearly differing messages posted to different sites, aimed at different followers, and between Arabic and English (Lynch, Freelon, & Aday, 2014). This is a common modern tactic in civil wars and human-causes acts of humanitarian crises, the post-truth age (Harsin, 2018).

Overall, it appears the White Helmets are a legitimate organization working diligently within a high-risk area to serve the Syrian community.  They provide an invaluable service that international organizations have struggled to do. Despite the conflict being ongoing, the organization has been successful in its mission, and seems to have the ability to continue doing so, despite the direct attacks on their lives and through the media to discredit them and attempt to eliminate their funding. That being said, Asif and Asif (2018) recommend that the White Helmets increase their indigenous independence by eliminating Western funding. While I understand this position, I think that there is always a struggle for organizations to have enough funding, so to get it from any source possible may be necessary in order to complete their mission.

I find the Syrian White Helmets to be incredibly inspiring personally and would like to see other models for indigenous humanitarian organizations given research and support around the world. I would like to see the larger international aid organizations focus their resources and funding towards supporting local, grassroots movements such as the White Helmets.  I think this is done in some capacity already, but I think there is much room for improvement.

References

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Amnesty International. (n.d.). Syria. Retrieved from https://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/syria/

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